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DO THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEGAL STANDARDS 
ON CLASS CERTIFICATION INCENTIVIZE 
FORUM SHOPPING?:  A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
CLASS CERTIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Shrey Sharma* 
 
The Class Action Fairness Act altered the jurisdictional landscape of 
class actions by relaxing the barriers to satisfying diversity jurisdiction in 
federal court.  As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently find themselves 
filing class actions in federal court, and face the critical question of where 
to initiate their lawsuit.  Many plaintiffs’ attorneys consider the favorability 
of legal standards when determining the forum in which to file their class 
action.  Among other substantive and procedural considerations, the 
applicable class certification standards of the forum are an important 
forum selection factor. 
The Second Circuit, in particular, is a forum that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
might consider due to its novel class certification standards on a range of 
unique areas of certification.  Plaintiffs seeking certification of very 
discrete class actions will be mindful of the Second Circuit’s certification 
criteria when deciding on a forum for their class action.  This Note details 
the Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence on the standard of 
appellate review of interlocutory appeals, satisfaction of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement in Rule 23(c)(4) 
single issue class actions, and certification of defendant classes under Rule 
23(b)(2).  This Note assesses whether these certification standards 
encourage forum shopping in district courts within the Second Circuit in 
light of the contrasting standards that other circuits have adopted on these 
issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attorney X is plaintiffs’ counsel for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3) class of residents suing manufacturers for releasing waste in 
Alabama over an eighty-five year period.1  Attorney X could file in state 
court, but, most likely, opposing counsel would successfully remove the 
action to federal court.2  Rather than spending resources fighting removal, 
Attorney X decides to initially file his case in federal court to expedite the 
 
 1. This class description is similar to the class in an Eleventh Circuit opinion. See 
Evans v. Walter Indus., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 2. As this Note later discusses, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) has significantly 
expanded federal removal jurisdiction over class action lawsuits that begin in state court. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012); infra Part I.A. 
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process.  However, he has an important decision to make that could shape 
the course of the litigation.3  He has to choose which federal forum is most 
suitable to his class action:  Forum A or Forum B? 
On one hand, Forum A might be a reasonable option, but it has strict 
requirements for satisfying predominance in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, 
which could defeat his action at the class certification stage.4  Moreover, if 
certification is denied, it is unlikely that he will win an appeal because 
Forum A reviews certification decisions under the deferential “abuse of 
discretion standard.”5 
On the other hand, Forum B has adopted a more lenient approach to 
predominance, increasing the odds that Attorney X’s class will be certified 
by the district court.6  Additionally, Forum B’s standard of appellate review 
is deferential to the district court only when the district court grants class 
certification.7  Forum B provides no deference to denials of class 
certification by the trial court.8  Therefore, if the trial court certifies the 
class, Attorney X can remain confident that the appellate court in Forum B 
will not reverse the trial court decision.9  If, however, the trial court denies 
class certification, there is a probability that the trial court’s certification 
denial will be reversed by the appellate court.10 
All other things being equal, which forum does Attorney X choose?  
Common sense dictates that he will choose Forum B because it strategically 
gives his action the best chance to move past the significant hurdle of class 
certification.11 
Attorneys considering various federal venues might likewise be 
incentivized to file their class actions in district courts within the Second 
Circuit because, like Forum B, it has legal standards that appear to favor 
class certification on several grounds.12  The Second Circuit varies from 
other federal circuits on major issues in federal class action practice, 
ranging from the appropriate standard of appellate review in class 
certification appeals to the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) to defendant class 
actions.13  This is critical in light of the fact that class certification has 
become less frequent in federal court, with fewer than one-fifth of all 
 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. Forum A’s predominance standard mirrors the Fifth Circuit approach in single issue 
class actions. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 5. Abuse of discretion is deferential to the trial court. See infra Part II.A.2; see also In 
re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 6. Forum B’s predominance standard mirrors the Second Circuit’s approach in single 
issue class actions. See In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 7. This is the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review on class certification. See 
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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classes getting certified.14  Thus, the Second Circuit’s approach warrants 
further scrutiny to see whether it actually incentivizes attorneys to choose it 
as a forum. 
This Note analyzes the Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence 
to determine whether its legal standards favor class certification.  It then 
compares the Second Circuit’s approach to other forums, emphasizing the 
differences that make the Second Circuit’s standards favorable to 
certification.  Ultimately, this Note evaluates the notion that the Second 
Circuit’s legal standards incentivize attorneys to file there to get class 
certification.15 
Part I of this Note provides background on class action practice in federal 
court, including how the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) expanded 
federal jurisdiction over class actions and the factors that attorneys consider 
when making decisions on choice of forum for class action litigation.  Part 
II discusses the Second Circuit’s approach on three areas of certification:  
(1) the standard of appellate review of interlocutory appeals,16 (2) 
satisfaction of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement in Rule 23(c)(4) 
single issue class actions,17 and (3) certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) defendant 
class.18  Part II then compares the Second Circuit’s approach on these issues 
to the approach of other forums.  Next, Part III assesses whether the Second 
Circuit’s standards on class certification encourage attorneys to file their 
class actions in the Second Circuit.  Finally, this Note answers that question 
in the affirmative, concluding that the Second Circuit’s applicable legal 
standards entice attorneys to file their class actions within the circuit. 
I.  A TREND TOWARD HORIZONTAL FORUM SHOPPING 
IN FEDERAL COURT 
Before analyzing whether the Second Circuit encourages forum 
shopping, it is important to explain the state of class action certification 
jurisprudence today.  Part I.A discusses the 2005 enactment of CAFA and 
its impact on federal jurisdiction over class actions.  Part I.B then surveys 
the factors that attorneys consider when making forum selection decisions 
in light of CAFA. 
 
 14. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in 
Class Action Litigation:  What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 605 
(2006); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:18, at 50 (5th 
ed. 2011). 
 15. It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit has similar standards in some areas of 
class certification jurisprudence. See, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 
2014).  This Note focuses on the Second Circuit. 
 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 17. See id. 23(b)(3), (c)(4). 
 18. See id. 23(b)(2). 
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A.  CAFA and the Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction 
over Class Actions 
CAFA supplements Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
federal court.19  CAFA was enacted as a part of the tort reform movement 
to eliminate forum shopping in state courts and reduce attorney’s fees in 
class action settlements.20  It sought to accomplish this by expanding 
diversity and removal jurisdiction in class action lawsuits.21  In essence, the 
legislative intent behind CAFA was to prevent forum shopping from 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in state court by giving defendants the ability to forum 
shop “horizontally”—meaning among the federal courts only and not the 
state system—in federal court through removal jurisdiction.22 
It is important to note the kind of forum shopping that occurs in federal 
class actions today.  CAFA enables “horizontal” forum shopping among the 
federal courts.23  CAFA makes “vertical” forum shopping, where attorneys 
have a choice between filing their class action in state or federal court, more 
difficult because the jurisdictional rules of CAFA are crafted in favor of 
federal jurisdiction.24  A plaintiffs’ attorney can only remand his case to 
state court if he is able to shape his class in a way that fits one of CAFA’s 
exceptions by preserving the action as predominantly a statewide, rather 
than a nationwide, action.25 
There has been an increase in federal class actions as a result of CAFA.26  
This can be explained, in part, by the relaxed diversity requirements for 
class actions in federal court.27  Plaintiffs’ lawyers who wish to file their 
class actions in federal court have to meet fairly minimal standards for 
diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy requirement.28  
Therefore, they face few jurisdictional obstacles in filing their cases in 
federal court.29 
 
 19. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
 20. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1593, 1597–602 (2008). 
 21. See id. at 1608. 
 22. See id. at 1607. 
 23. See Justin D. Forlenza, Note, CAFA and Erie:  Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1085–86 (2006). 
 24. See id. at 1086. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:  A Tale of Waste 
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (2008). 
 27. Prior to CAFA, diversity jurisdiction required complete diversity between the named 
plaintiffs and the defendants. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 
(1921).  Additionally, the amount in controversy for the class representative had to exceed 
$75,000, while class members could satisfy the amount in controversy by alleging claims 
less than $75,000 if they were added as tagalong claims under supplemental jurisdiction. See 
Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204, 205 (8th Cir. 1968).  CAFA eased the requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction by requiring minimal diversity of citizenship, which demands only that 
any plaintiff in the case has to be diverse from any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) 
(2012).  CAFA also created a $5 million amount in controversy that needs to be satisfied 
only in the aggregate and not on an individual basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 29. See id. 
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CAFA, however, also works to the benefit of defendants.30  Defendants 
seeking to remove the case from state court to federal court likely can 
unless the class fits a number of jurisdictional exceptions that would 
remand the case to state court.31  These exceptions include the “local 
controversy” exception,32 “the home state” exception,33 and the 
discretionary jurisdiction exception.34  Federal district courts also cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over cases where the state is the primary defendant 
against whom the district court would be unable to order relief or where 
there were fewer than one hundred proposed plaintiff class members.35  
Although defendants have the burden of proof on removal, they only need 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that federal jurisdiction 
exists.36 
The number of removals from state court to federal court has increased 
after the enactment of CAFA.37  The data show that this increase applies to 
the exercise of both federal question and removal jurisdiction.38  Indeed, the 
 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. The first exception to minimal diversity compels the district court to decline 
jurisdiction if more than two-thirds of the proposed class are citizens of the forum state 
where the action was originally filed and at least one of the defendants is one “from whom 
significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class; whose alleged conduct forms a 
significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and who is a citizen 
of the State in which the action was originally filed.” See id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II).  Remand 
to state court is also required if the “principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or 
any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was 
originally filed,” id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III), and “during the 3-year period preceding the 
filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar 
factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons,” id. 
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). See Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 134 (2006). 
 33. The second exception to minimal diversity requires that at least two-thirds of the 
proposed class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state where the 
action was originally filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B); see also Puiszis, supra note 32, at 
134. 
 34. The third exception to CAFA’s minimal diversity exception is discretionary and 
allows a district court to decline jurisdiction over a class action where between one-third and 
two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the forum state where the action was 
originally filed.  The district court can consider a number of factors pertinent to this 
determination, including 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid 
Federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct 
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; (E) whether the 
number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all 
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number 
of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the 
proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and (F) whether, 
during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other 
class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other 
persons have been filed. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(C)–(F); see also Puiszis, supra note 32, at 141–42. 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
 36. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553–54 (2014). 
 37. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, § 1:18, at 48. 
 38. See id. 
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number of diversity filings has increased by nearly 72 percent since CAFA 
was enacted.39  Moreover, efforts to circumvent CAFA by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers seeking to keep their class actions in state court have had varying 
results; the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly rejected attempts to keep the 
amount in controversy under $5 million, while attempts to keep the number 
of plaintiffs under one hundred have found more success.40 
Appellate courts have the power to exercise review over trial court 
decisions to grant removal.41  It is unclear how frequently they choose to 
exercise this power.  It is clear, however, that the nature of forum selection 
for plaintiffs has changed as a result of CAFA, largely shifting the emphasis 
of massive class actions from state forums to federal forums.42 
B.  Forum Shopping Decisions in Federal Court 
Data show that federal class action filings have continued to increase in 
recent years.43  While the expansion of removal jurisdiction likely accounts 
for a significant portion of this increase, it appears that a majority of 
diversity class actions now originate in federal court because attorneys wish 
to avoid delays that accompany removal from state court.44  The 
jurisdiction in which a class action is filed becomes a central strategic 
decision for plaintiffs’ attorneys who have options regarding the venue for 
the class action.45  Forum selection plays a prominent role in class action 
strategy, particularly if plaintiffs choose to circumvent the removal process 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:17, at 559–62 (5th 
ed. 2012). 
 41. See id. § 6:15, at 548–49. 
 42. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1607–08. 
 43. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra D. Lahav, The New Class Action Landscape:  
Trends and Developments in Class Certification and Related Topics 58 (Ctr. for Law & 
Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 435, 2012); see also 
Erichson, supra note 20, at 1611.  Securities class actions account for nearly half of all class 
actions. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & DANIEL WOLF, CLASS CERTIFICATION:  TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS (2004–2009), at 18 tbl. 1 (2009), http:// 
www.gotofirm.com/content/uploads/2012/12/CLASS-CERTIFICATION-Developments-
Over-the-Last-Five-Years-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6L7-9XRQ].  According to recent 
data, more than sixty securities class actions were filed in the Second Circuit in 2014, while 
fifty were filed in the Ninth Circuit. See RENZO COMOLLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:  2014 FULL-
YEAR REVIEW 10 (2015), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/ 
PUB_Full_Year_Trends_2014_0115.pdf [https://perma.cc/A78H-2PAH].  After these two 
circuits, no other circuit received more than twenty-six securities class action filings in 2014. 
See id.  However, this data fails to explain whether the Second Circuit is actually a plaintiff-
friendly forum—the Second Circuit naturally may see more securities filings because it 
encompasses all of New York City. 
 44. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1611; see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1759 (2008).  Under CAFA, 
appellate judges may take sixty days to review a remand motion upon the filing of appeal 
and may extend this deadline under special circumstances or if the parties agree. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2012). 
 45. See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK § 3.04, at 86–88 
(2014); Lee & Willging, supra note 44, at 1759. 
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and affirmatively decide to file their case in federal court.46  This is because 
the choice of venue is left to the plaintiffs, who can choose from an 
assortment of federal forums and must weigh the favorability of the forum’s 
procedural and substantive law to the class, the convenience of the location, 
and other factors.47 
The factors that attorneys consider when choosing a federal forum are 
critical in understanding why the Second Circuit’s class certification 
standards matter.  One study demonstrates that the perceived favorableness 
of the applicable substantive or procedural federal law is an important 
forum selection factor for attorneys choosing a venue for their federal class 
actions.48  This stems out of attorney perceptions of a judge’s 
predispositions to rule for one side or the other.49  The study indicates that 
among other considerations, these perceptions were based on attorneys’ 
judgments regarding the receptivity of the court to the attorneys’ claims.50  
This was measured by surveying 728 attorneys who filed class actions in 
federal court or had them removed to federal court by asking which factors 
were most important in their forum selection decision.51  This factor was 
found to be a “primary” factor in the report generated from the study.52 
For defendants removing the case from state to federal court, strict class 
certification standards are an important feature of a desirable federal 
forum.53  In fact, 47 percent of the surveyed defendants who removed their 
class actions to federal court reported favorable class certification procedure 
as a reason for removal.54  A small percentage of defense attorneys seeking 
class certification of a settlement considered the receptiveness of the court 
toward settlement, which necessarily entails certification.55 
Plaintiffs are less likely to file their class action in federal court based on 
the applicable class certification standards in large part because federal 
courts are more likely to deny class certification motions than state courts.56  
However, this does not necessarily tell the whole story.  Generally, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys do not file their class actions in federal court by 
choice.57  This study did not differentiate between plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
filed in federal court to bypass the inevitable process of losing on a remand 
 
 46. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1607; see also Rory Ryan, Note, Uncertifiable?:  The 
Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 468 (2002) 
(finding that state choice of law questions often defeat certification of nationwide class 
actions). 
 47. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 613–14. 
 48. See id. at 612; see also Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law 
Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009) (noting that 
choice of law issues frequently factor into state law class actions in federal court). 
 49. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 624–25. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 601. 
 52. See id. at 611. 
 53. See id. at 618. 
 54. See id. at 617. 
 55. See id.; see also FED R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 56. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 635.  State law is typically more 
favorable than federal law on class certification for plaintiffs. See id. at 637–38. 
 57. See id. 
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motion and plaintiffs’ attorneys who filed in federal court because it 
conferred some advantage to the class action that could not be found in state 
court.58  Regardless of the reason for filing in federal court, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are highly cognizant of the applicable substantive law that might 
favor their claims.59 
One study indicates that the Second Circuit, in addition to the Ninth 
Circuit, is considered lenient relative to other federal courts in granting 
class certification, and thus plaintiffs’ attorneys believe that their class is 
more likely to be certified in this jurisdiction.60  Conversely, the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits are perceived as being less lenient in granting class 
certification.61  A detailed discussion on the Second Circuit’s class 
certification jurisprudence in contrast to other federal forums is necessary to 
understand whether these perceived notions were formed due to leniency in 
granting certification. 
II.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
CLASS CERTIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE 
The Second Circuit and the other circuits appear to be at odds with 
respect to class action jurisprudence.  This split in judicial philosophy is 
prevalent in three main areas of class certification:  the standard of appellate 
review of class certification, satisfaction of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
requirement in single issue Rule 23(c)(4) class actions, and certification of 
defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2). 
Part II.A provides a comparative analysis between the Second Circuit’s 
standard of appellate review of class certification decisions and those of the 
other circuits.  Next, Part II.B contrasts the Second Circuit’s standard on 
predominance in 23(b)(3) class actions, where single issues are receiving 
class treatment, to another approach.  Then, Part II.C then analyzes the 
Second Circuit’s unique approach toward 23(b)(2) defendant class actions, 
which varies from the approach of the other circuits. 
A.  Standard of Appellate Review for Class Certification 
As a general principle, appellate courts review lower court rulings on 
class certification under the abuse of discretion standard.62  The abuse of 
discretion standard is extremely deferential, and an appellate court will 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 616. 
 60. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1612. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14:19, at 557 (5th ed. 
2014).  In fact, every circuit other than the Second, Seventh, and Ninth applies this standard. 
See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014); Day v. Persels & 
Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 
377 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2013); In re 
Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Prods. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 
2013); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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normally affirm the trial judge’s decision unless that decision “rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.”63  The Second Circuit has tweaked the abuse of 
discretion standard of review so that greater deference is given to grants of 
class certification than to denials.64  The Seventh Circuit has altered the 
abuse of discretion standard in a way that emphasizes careful compliance 
with the “rigorous analysis” doctrine outlined by the Supreme Court.65  Part 
II.A.1 provides in-depth analysis of the Second Circuit’s standard of 
appellate review of class certification decisions.  Part II.A.2 assesses the 
abuse of discretion standard adopted by the other circuits generally.  
Finally, Part II.A.3 sheds light on the standard adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit. 
1.  The Second Circuit’s Approach:  
Greater Deference for Grants of Class Certification 
The Second Circuit has adopted a novel approach regarding the standard 
of review of grants and denials of class certification.  One commentator has 
gone so far as to take aim at the Second Circuit, alleging that its standard of 
appellate review disproportionately favors plaintiffs.66  This approach 
follows a long line of case law stemming from a decision in 1983.67 
As the Second Circuit noted in a recent holding, it provides greater 
deference to the district court if the district court grants class certification 
but applies a “noticeably less deferential standard” to denials of class 
certification.68  It is critical to not only understand what the Second 
Circuit’s standard of review is but how the court has applied it in class 
certification decisions spanning several decades.  The facts of each case 
help color how the Second Circuit has handled issues for plaintiff class 
certification in areas ranging from antitrust to labor violations.69 
The Second Circuit’s flexibility in applying the abuse of discretion 
standard surfaced in Abrams v. Interco Inc.,70 a 1983 antitrust action 
alleging price fixing on the part of an apparel manufacturer.71  The case was 
filed by a class action attorney on behalf of all purchasers of Interco 
 
 63. Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 377. 
 64. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2015).  The Ninth 
Circuit also applies this approach. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 65. See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 
2011).  The Supreme Court ruled that a class “may only be certified if the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” 
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
 66. See Jonah Knobler, Class Actions in the Second Circuit:  Do Plaintiffs Have an 
Unfair Advantage?, 253 N.Y. L.J. 46 (2015). 
 67. See Roach, 778 F.3d at 405; Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d 
Cir. 2003); see also Lundquist v. Sec. Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 
1993); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 
F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 68. Roach, 778 F.3d at 405. 
 69. See id.; Abrams, 719 F.2d at 25. 
 70. 719 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 71. See id. at 25. 
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products over a four-year period.72  The theory was that Interco had entered 
into an agreement to fix prices with more than seven thousand independent 
retail stores across the country.73 
After the district court denied class certification, the plaintiffs appealed 
the denial and argued that abuse of discretion should be applied only under 
limited circumstances, such as when adequacy of representation is not 
met.74  The Second Circuit ruled that the abuse of discretion is the proper 
standard of appellate review in class certification decisions, with the caveat 
that the standard must be applied flexibly.75  As such, it blurred the lines 
between the abuse of discretion and de novo standards, holding a “judge’s 
discretion is not boundless and must be exercised within the applicable 
rules of law or equity.”76  Ultimately, the court upheld the district court 
ruling denying class certification, in large part because providing notice to 
class members would be tedious, rendering the lawsuit unmanageable.77 
Ten years later, the court elucidated its standard of appellate review on 
class certification decisions in Robidoux v. Celani,78 laying the foundation 
for the standard that is still used today.79  Robidoux dealt with a class action 
lawsuit by individuals applying for public assistance in Vermont suing for 
unlawful delays by the Vermont Department of Social Welfare in 
determining eligibility for the assistance.80  The plaintiffs contended that 
the defendant’s failure to process their applications within the thirty-day 
guideline mandated by federal law constituted hardship because these 
individuals relied on public assistance as their sole source of income.81 
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all current and future recipients 
of public assistance in Vermont.82  The district court denied class 
certification because the class size failed the numerosity requirement of 
Rule 23(a)(1).83  The court reasoned that the class consisted of only three 
actual plaintiffs, and the other members of the class were an undetermined 
number based on speculation.84  The court also ruled that the class failed 
the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) because recipients of a fuel 
assistance program did not suffer any delay or refusal.85 
On appeal, the Second Circuit modified the standard of appellate review 
in class certification decisions.86  The court began its opinion by noting that 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 27–28. 
 75. See id. at 28. 
 76. Id. (quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th 
Cir. 1977)). 
 77. Id. at 30–34. 
 78. 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 79. See id. at 935. 
 80. See id. at 933. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 934. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 935. 
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district courts should receive tremendous deference in determinations of the 
facts of a case but deserve little deference on the legal conclusions forming 
the basis of their rulings on class certification.87  The court further stated 
that abuses of discretion occur more frequently in class certification denials 
than in other areas of the law, though it declined to say why.88 
Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that the class should have 
been certified even though it consisted of only three plaintiffs.89  It 
determined that the numerosity requirement only necessitates a finding that 
joinder of all class members is “impracticable,” not “impossible.”90  
Moreover, there is no exact number or class size to satisfy the requirement, 
and the preliminary evidence that there were delays in 22 to 133 cases per 
month was sufficient.91  Finally, the court held that the typicality element 
was met, even though the class definition was overly broad, because the 
district court needed to determine as a matter of fact whether there were at 
least some recipients of the fuel assistance program who suffered from 
delay or refusal.92 
This holding set a standard that was subsequently modified in Lundquist 
v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp.,93 which was 
decided shortly after Robidoux.94  The case dealt with a consumer class 
action alleging violations of the Consumer Leasing Act by the defendant.95  
The complaint included violations of federal consumer protection law, state 
common law, and “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” statutes.96  
Plaintiff Betty Lundquist sought to certify a class consisting of all persons 
who signed leases with the defendant similar to the one she signed:  her 
automobile lease held her in default and liable if she decided to terminate it 
early.97 
The district court declined to certify the class for failure to satisfy the 
commonality and typicality requirements.98  On appeal, the Second Circuit 
remodeled the abuse of discretion standard, following its previous rulings 
that had loosened the standard.99  It concluded from the holdings in Abrams 
and Robidoux that the court is “noticeably less deferential to the district 
court when that court has denied class status than when it has certified a 
 
 87. See id. (“Except to the extent that the ruling is based on determinations of fact . . . or 
where the trial judge’s experience in the instant case or in similar cases has given him a 
degree of knowledge superior to that of appellate judges, as often occurs, review of class 
action determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ does not differ greatly from review for error.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 935–36. 
 90. Id. at 935. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 936–37. 
 93. 993 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 94. See id. at 14. 
 95. See id. at 12. 
 96. Id. at 14. 
 97. See id. at 12–14. 
 98. See id. at 14. 
 99. See id. 
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class.”100  Applying this standard, the court concluded that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion, and it affirmed the lower court’s ruling.101 
While the Lundquist Court did not rule in the plaintiff’s favor, it crafted 
the modern standard for the Second Circuit to apply in subsequent 
decisions.102  The standard seemed to flow naturally from the prior 
decisions in Abrams and Robidoux.103  This new standard was applied in a 
2003 decision pertaining to a consumer class action against Time Warner 
Entertainment, Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.104  In Parker, two 
cable subscribers sued Time Warner for violating federal and state 
consumer protection law by disclosing consumer information to third 
parties.105 
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class including subscribers to Time 
Warner’s cable package whose privacy interests were violated by the 
disclosure.106  The district court denied certification on the grounds that the 
class failed predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) due to the 
manageability concerns of handling a class with more than twelve million 
people.107 
The Second Circuit reversed under the clarified abuse of discretion 
standard and remanded the case to the district court.108  On the Rule 
23(b)(3) issue, the circuit court reasoned that, without further discovery, the 
district court could not deny class certification because it was unclear how 
many individuals actually were a part of the class or how many would opt-
out.109  Moreover, the district court prematurely applied the “incidental” 
standard in the 23(b)(2) analysis when the Second Circuit had, in fact, 
adopted a broader “ad hoc” approach.110  Therefore, the court granted a 
victory to plaintiffs in a major class action lawsuit.111 
The most recent Second Circuit decision applying its modified standard 
of appellate review occurred in early 2015 in Roach v. T.L. Cannon 
Corp.112  Roach featured a lawsuit by four Applebee’s employees against 
T.L. Cannon Corp., which owned the franchises where they were employed, 
for federal and state labor law violations.113  The plaintiffs alleged that staff 
had to subtract time for statutorily mandated work breaks (rest break claim), 
and that they did not receive extra payment when working more than ten 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 14–15 (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the other class members 
defaulted under similar circumstances or were harmed by the illegality of the lease). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 14; Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Abrams v. 
Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 104. 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 105. See id. at 15. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 17. 
 108. See id. at 18–21. 
 109. See id. at 21–22. 
 110. Id. at 20. 
 111. See id. at 22–23. 
 112. 778 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 113. See id. at 403. 
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hours (spread of hours claim), as required by New York law.114  The 
plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of Applebee’s employees, 
“subclassed” into the two claims.115 
The district court denied class certification, holding that the plaintiffs’ 
failure to “offer a damages model that [is] ‘susceptible of measurement 
across the entire class’” prevented class certification.116  The district court 
reasoned that the damages in the individual case were too individualized for 
class treatment, thereby failing the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3).117  It strictly construed the ruling in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,118 
leaving little room for the plaintiffs to satisfy predominance without 
creating a class-wide damages model.119 
The Second Circuit ruled that the lower court misconstrued the ruling in 
Comcast, reversing the district court and vacating the judgment.120  The 
court held that Comcast did not overrule an existing line of case law in the 
Second Circuit that established that individual ascertainability of damages 
itself does not defeat predominance for a Rule 23(b)(3) class.121 
The court began by explaining its interpretation of the law set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Comcast.122  In that case, the Court dealt with an 
antitrust suit where Comcast’s acquisition of a cable television provider 
catapulted its market share in Philadelphia from 23.9 percent to 69.5 
percent.123  To satisfy predominance, the plaintiffs offered expert testimony 
that modeled the injuries on four different theories of antitrust injury.124  
However, the Court rejected the argument that this was sufficient to 
demonstrate that common issues predominated over individual ones.125  It 
relied on its holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,126 where it 
reaffirmed the “rigorous analysis” requirement to meet 23(b)(3) 
predominance.127  This standard allows a court to consider the merits of the 
case when reviewing class certification decisions.128  In Comcast, the Court 
denied predominance because the model formulated by the plaintiffs’ expert 
was based on four different theories of antitrust violations, whereas the 
plaintiffs only advanced the “overbuilder” theory in the complaint.129 
Thus, in the view of the Second Circuit, Comcast does not stand for the 
proposition that inability to measure damages on a class-wide basis 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 404 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013)). 
 117. See id. 
 118. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Roach, 778 F.3d at 408–09. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at 405. 
 123. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1434. 
 126. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 127. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1428. 
 128. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 129. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434. 
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automatically results in failure of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.130  Instead, 
it merely states that, to meet the predominance requirement, a class-wide 
damages model must measure damages stemming from the class’ asserted 
theory only.131  Therefore, in Roach, the district court erred by focusing its 
analysis solely on the question of whether class-wide damages could be 
measured, because this logic ran contrary to the established jurisprudence in 
the Second Circuit.132 
2.  The Majority Approach:  Abuse of Discretion 
The majority of circuit courts give strong deference to the lower courts 
on class certification decisions.133  The circuits reverse a certification 
decision only if “the record provides strong evidence that the trial judge 
indulged a serious lapse in judgment” under the abuse of discretion 
standard.134  It is useful to illustrate the application of this standard in at 
least two cases to contrast with the Second Circuit’s approach. 
In Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray,135 the trial court 
certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class action of all persons who had sold assets to 
the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s common stock.136  In this 
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, the court found that the common 
question of breach of contractual warranty predominated over individual 
questions of statute of limitations defenses.137  The appellate court agreed 
with the defendant’s argument that the district court was required to 
consider affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations defenses, 
during the class certification stage.138  However, the court found that the 
district court had considered these defenses thoroughly but was not 
persuaded that individual issues regarding the defenses should prevent 
certification of a claim that otherwise met the Rule 23(a) prerequisites.139  
Therefore, the First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting class certification.140 
 
 130. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 409. 
 133. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014); Day v. Persels & 
Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 
377 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2013); In re 
Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Prods. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 
2013); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 134. Lupron, 677 F.3d at 31 (quoting Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 
F.3d 867, 875 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 135. 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 136. See id. at 291–92. 
 137. See id. at 292–96. 
 138. See id. at 296. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 299. 
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In Rodriguez v. National City Bank,141 the plaintiffs filed a 23(b)(3) class 
action against a bank alleging racially discriminatory practices in violation 
of the Fair Housing Act.142  The district court found that the class failed 
23(a)(2) commonality and denied certification.143  The district court 
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ allegation that they were charged more heavily 
than other borrowers was inadequate because they failed to show a 
disparate impact in each of the loan applications.144  On appeal, the Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court ruling, finding that the district court was 
within its discretion to require an affirmative showing of commonality on 
the part of the plaintiffs.145 
3.  The Seventh Circuit:  Deferential but Not Abject 
The Seventh Circuit has adopted an approach that also contrasts with the 
Second Circuit but deviates from the majority’s abuse of discretion 
standard.146  The Seventh Circuit recognizes that appellate review of a class 
certification is deferential;147 however, it adds the caveat that “deferential” 
does not mean “abject.”148  The language provided by the Seventh Circuit is 
not particularly enlightening as to what the standard actually means, and 
thus it warrants further consideration to see how it applies in practice. 
The Seventh Circuit standard was recently applied in CE Design Ltd. v. 
King Architectural Metals, Inc.,149 a 2011 decision written by Judge 
Richard Posner.150  CE Design featured a consumer class action alleging 
that the defendant had sent out unsolicited fax advertisements in violation 
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.151  The complaint alleged that 
King, the defendant, had sent over 500,000 faxes during one month in 
2009.152  The statutory damages were $500 for each violation.153  The 
plaintiff, a civil engineering firm which received two advertisements from 
the defendant, moved to certify a class of recipients of King advertisements 
who had not given express permission to receive faxed advertisements.154  
The plaintiff was a professional class action plaintiff that had filed over 150 
consumer class actions under the statute.155 
 
 141. 726 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 142. See id. at 374.  The plaintiffs were minority mortgage borrowers. See id. 
 143. See id. at 376. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 378–79. 
 146. See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 637 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 150. See id. at 723. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 724. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. at 723–24. 
 155. See id. at 723. 
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The district court certified the class, finding that the class had met the 
requirements in Rule 23(a).156  However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
vacated the lower court ruling and remanded it under the 
“deferential . . . [but not] abject” standard of appellate review.157  The court 
focused its analysis on the defendant’s contention that the class did not 
meet the adequacy of representation or typicality of the claims 
requirements.158  The court held that the Seventh Circuit standard asks 
whether the claim of the class representative would be subject to defenses 
typical to the rest of the class.159  If the defense asserted against the plaintiff 
is not typical, the class representative is not adequate under Rule 
23(a)(4).160  The defense asserted against the plaintiff was a consent 
defense based on the theory that the plaintiff posted its fax number and the 
words “Contact Us” on its website, soliciting advertisements.161 
The court found that this defense might have been atypical of the rest of 
the class, potentially defeating certification for the plaintiffs on both 
typicality and adequacy.162  The court reasoned that the consent defense 
would be especially applicable to the class representative because it listed 
its information in the Blue Book for businesses.163  Moreover, the class 
representative potentially lacked credibility because the president of the 
civil engineering firm that served as plaintiff appeared to misunderstand the 
purpose of subscribing to the Blue Book during his deposition.164  In light of 
the evidence against certification, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court.165  However, it noted that the plaintiffs could circumvent 
the typicality and adequacy limitations by adding new class representatives 
and creating subclasses for certification.166 
B.  The Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) 
in Rule 23(c)(4) Single Issue Class Actions 
Another dichotomy exists in the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3).167  Rule 23(b)(3) requires that (1) common issues of fact or law 
“predominate” over individual ones and (2)  that the class action is superior 
 
 156. See id. at 727–28. 
 157. Id. at 723. 
 158. See id. at 724. 
 159. Id. at 725. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 728. 
 163. See id. at 725. 
 164. See id. at 725–26. 
 165. See id. at 728. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See Michael J. Wylie, Note, In the Ongoing Debate Between the Expansive and 
Limited Interpretations of Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), Advantage Expansivists!, 76 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 349, 354 (2007) (defining the Second Circuit view as an “expansive” reading of 
23(c)(4) and the Fifth Circuit view as a “limited” interpretation). Compare In re Nassau Cty. 
Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006) (certifying a 23(b)(3) class in a 
23(c)(4) class action), with Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(reversing the district court’s decision to certify a 23(b)(3) class in a 23(c)(4) class action). 
894 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
to other methods of resolving the controversy.168  Rule 23(b)(3) lists a 
number of factors relevant to these considerations.169  To satisfy 
predominance, the judge may order class treatment to particular issues 
under 23(c)(4).170 
The Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit have different criteria for satisfying 
the predominance requirement of 23(b)(3) in 23(c)(4) single issue class 
actions.171  The Second Circuit has a more lenient approach in allowing 
predominance,172 while the Fifth Circuit is more restrictive in granting 
certification of 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions.173  Part II.B.1 dissects the 
Second Circuit’s treatment of predominance in single issue class actions, 
while Part II.B.2 analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s approach toward 
predominance in 23(c)(4) class actions.174 
1.  The Second Circuit Approach:  
Sufficient Cohesion to Satisfy Predominance 
The Second Circuit predominance standard emerged in 2006 in In re 
Nassau County Strip Search Cases,175 a civil rights class action alleging 
constitutional violations on the part of the Nassau County Police 
Department in New York.176  Nassau County had a blanket policy of strip 
searching all newly admitted detainees arrested for committing 
misdemeanors.177  The plaintiffs sued under federal civil rights law, federal 
constitutional law, and New York State constitutional law.178  After 
consolidation of three separate class actions, the plaintiffs moved to certify 
a class of “all persons arrested for or charged with non-felony offenses who 
have been admitted to the Nassau County Correctional Center and strip 
searched without particularized reasonable suspicion.”179 
The district court denied certification of the 23(b)(3) class for failure to 
satisfy predominance.180  The court reasoned that the individual issues in 
 
 168. These class actions are known as “common question” class actions whereby 
common questions must predominate over individual ones. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see 
also RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, COMPLEX 
LITIGATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 299–301 (6th ed. 
2015). 
 169. (1) The class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions, (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members, (3) the desirability or undesirability 
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (4) the likely 
difficulties in managing a class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
 170. See id. 23(c)(4). 
 171. Compare Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 226–27, with Castano, 84 F.3d at 741. 
 172. See Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 226–27. 
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the case predominated over the common ones.181  Primarily, there were 
individual questions of whether subordinate officers had reasonable 
suspicion to search detainees in some cases, whether there was proximate 
causation for each injury, and calculations of punitive and compensatory 
damages.182  These issues weighed against the common questions of 
whether the defendants implemented a blanket strip search policy, whether 
it was unconstitutional, and whether all or some of the defendants were 
liable.183 
Applying its unique standard of review, the Second Circuit articulated 
that the predominance inquiry requires that the proposed class is 
“sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”184  Under 
this predominance test, the court reversed the district court ruling denying 
class certification.185 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that variations among class members 
regarding applicability of defenses do not necessarily prevent eventual class 
certification.186  It then surveyed the different stances among the federal 
appellate courts on this precise question, noting that the Fifth Circuit 
adopted a strict interpretation of predominance,187 while the Ninth Circuit 
allows isolation of common issues for class treatment.188  The Second 
Circuit favored the Ninth Circuit approach largely because this 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) was consistent with the plain language of the 
Rule as well as the intent of the drafters.189  Furthermore, predominance 
analysis condenses to whether a particular issue is “susceptible to 
generalized, class-wide proof.”190 
In Nassau County, a portion of this proof came in the form of a 
concession by the defendants that they had committed constitutional 
violations by instituting the strip search policy.191  In fact, at this point the 
policy had already been rescinded by Nassau County.192  Preventing 
consideration of concession issues in predominance analysis would force 
each plaintiff to sue individually and prove the defendant’s liability,193 
whereas certifying the class would have the binding, preclusive effect on 
the issue of Nassau County’s liability.  The court recognized that a 
significant rationale for the continuance of the class action was to place 
absent class members on notice of the action.194 
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The logic was that many individuals in New York State were unaware 
that their rights were constitutionally violated and thus would have no 
recourse to pursue a legal remedy without mandatory notification through 
class certification.195  Denying plaintiffs the benefit of aggregate litigation 
would be counterproductive when, ironically, the issue of liability in this 
23(c)(4) class action was uncontested.196 
2.  The Fifth Circuit Approach:  
The Cause of Action as a Whole Must Satisfy Predominance 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach is the polar opposite of the Second Circuit’s 
approach.  Its standard came from what was one of the largest class actions 
ever attempted in federal court, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.197  Here, 
the American tobacco industry was sued by a class of nicotine-dependent 
Americans who bought cigarettes manufactured by the defendants.198  The 
plaintiffs sued under nine causes of action, including fraud, breach of 
express warranty, breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, 
and violation of state consumer statutes.199  The plaintiffs sought to break 
this complex class action into four phases.200  The court certified the class 
under 23(a) and 23(b)(3), finding that the class met the predominance and 
superiority requirements under each of the four trial phases.201 
On interlocutory appeal by the defendants, the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that two essential questions had not been 
answered.202  The first was that the district court failed to account for 
variations in state law in finding predominance and superiority.203  The 
second was that the district court did not address how a trial would be 
conducted with so many complex issues to be resolved.204  Both issues 
militated against a finding that common issues predominated.205 
On the first question, the court reasoned that there were variances in state 
law on at least four of the causes of action listed in the complaint, in 
addition to affirmative defenses and punitive damages.206  Moreover, the 
district court merely glossed over the choice-of-law question and did not 
articulate any kind of methodology it would adopt in deciding the choice of 
law that would apply for each cause of action.207  Finally, it did not discuss 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 228. 
 197. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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 199. See id. 
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 201. See id. at 738–39. 
 202. See id. at 740. 
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 204. See id. 
 205. See id. at 740–41. 
 206. See id. at 741–43. 
 207. See id. at 743. 
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how the class action would remain manageable in the face of potentially 
fifty applicable legal standards on each state cause of action.208 
On the second question, the court found the district court’s predominance 
inquiry was inadequate because the court refused to go past the pleadings to 
make such a determination.209  The Fifth Circuit held that this was an 
improper application of Rule 23(b)(3) because the lower court was 
attempting to advance the case due to its individual merits, while the 
predominance inquiry is intended to be a strictly legal determination.210  
Furthermore, without an analysis beyond the pleadings, it would be 
impossible to determine how individual addiction claims and levels of 
exposure could be treated on a class-wide basis.211  Lastly, high individual 
damages awards made individual suits possible, defeating the superiority of 
the class action.212 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that individual issues (in this case, 
choice of law considerations and individual addiction claims) cannot be 
merged into the other common issues for class-wide treatment.213  
Predominance requires going beyond the pleadings to determine if the 
substantive law weighs in favor of certifying the class action.214  As the 
Fifth Circuit believes, severing issues under Rule 23(c)(4) would not help 
the class meet certification because the cause of action as a whole must 
satisfy the requirements.215 
C.  Certifying Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2) 
Defendant class actions, whereby a class represented by a plaintiff sues a 
class represented by a defendant, are considered a rarity in federal court, in 
large part because the class certification requirements are the same as 
ordinary plaintiff class actions.216  However, they are important devices to 
enforce substantive legal rights, particularly in civil rights cases when 
numerous government officials are being sued and therefore deserve 
scrutiny in the certification context.217  Defendants scarcely will choose to 
serve as the class representative, forcing the plaintiff to choose one 
instead.218  The result is that courts may be less willing to determine that 
 
 208. See id.  The applicable state law varied on fraud, products liability, negligent 
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 209. See id. at 744. 
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the class satisfies adequacy because defendants only reluctantly serve as 
class representatives.219 
One particular controversy in defendant class actions is whether these 
types of lawsuits can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).220  While 23(b)(1) 
class actions are generally accepted221 and 23(b)(3) class actions are 
possible, though unfeasible, there is no clear consensus on actions based on 
declaratory or injunctive relief (23(b)(2) class actions).222  The Second 
Circuit has taken the view that 23(b)(2) defendant class actions can pass 
certification while the majority of circuits have interpreted the Rule as only 
applying to plaintiff class actions.223  Part II.C.1 scrutinizes the Second 
Circuit’s functional approach, which allows defendant classes in 23(b)(2) 
class actions.  Part II.C.2 then examines the literal approach, which declines 
to certify defendant class actions. 
1.  The Second Circuit’s Functional Approach:  
Permitting Defendant Classes in 23(b)(2) Class Actions 
The Second Circuit first ruled on this issue in Marcera v. Chinlund,224 a 
case against forty-two county sheriffs in New York State.225  The chief 
allegation was that these sheriffs (and by extension, the counties) had 
violated the constitutional rights of detainees who were required to remain 
in police custody until trial.226  These detainees sued on the theory that they 
were denied the opportunity to see their families before trial.227 
Two plaintiffs who were inmates at the Monroe County jail served as the 
class representatives for the plaintiffs.228  Sheriff William Lombard of 
Monroe County likewise served as class representative for the defendants, 
consisting of the forty-two sheriffs across New York State who had 
instituted this policy of detainment.229  However, the district court ruled 
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 220. Compare Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 478 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant 
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656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003) (certifying a defendant class under 23(b)(1)(B)). 
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 223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 224. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). 
 225. See id. at 1235. 
 226. See id. at 1237.  
 227. See id. at 1235. 
 228. See id. 
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that the defendant class failed certification.230  It held that Rule 23(a)(3) 
typicality and 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation were not satisfied 
because the defenses asserted by Sheriff Lombard were not typical of the 
defenses asserted by the other sheriffs.231  Lombard claimed that contact 
visits posed a security risk to the Monroe County jail because they would 
create potential violence among inmates and incentivize smuggling of 
contraband into the jail.232  Although the other jails would be making 
similar claims, Lombard reasoned that his modern, 325-inmate facility was 
substantially different from other ones in the state, such as the jail in rural 
Wyoming County.233 
The Second Circuit disagreed with this logic, holding that the class 
satisfied typicality and adequacy.234  The Second Circuit found that 
Lombard had made strong defenses of his position, making him an adequate 
representative of the other sheriffs across the state.235  Moreover, his 
defense was typical of the defenses other sheriffs were making because the 
rationales prohibiting contact visits were generally limited to security, 
inmate violence, and contraband.236  Additionally, while the class 
representative himself opposed certification, the court ruled that the 
representative need not be willing, only adequate under Rule 23(a)(4).237  
The Second Circuit ultimately held that defendant class actions may be 
permitted under Rule 23(b)(2) despite the defendant’s unwillingness to 
serve as class representative.238 
Though the Second Circuit was not bound by this vacated judgment, it 
chose to follow its prior reasoning almost thirty years later in Brown v. 
Kelly.239  In Kelly, the court dealt with a class of plaintiffs suing the state 
for enforcement of a penal law deemed unconstitutional.240  The plaintiff 
class included all persons arrested, summonsed, or prosecuted under the 
law, and the defendant class consisted of all New York State law 
enforcement officials with the powers to enforce the statute.241 
The district court certified both the plaintiff and defendant classes, 
finding that the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) were 
met.242  However, the Second Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that both 
classes failed typicality and adequacy.243  The court reasoned that the 
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defendant class representatives might be liable for compensatory and 
punitive damages in addition to injunctive relief, whereas the class 
members themselves were only subject to injunctive relief.244  Moreover, 
there was a lack of statewide practice of enforcing the unconstitutional law, 
defeating typicality because all state law enforcement officers were being 
sued.245 
Despite denying certification, the importance of this holding was that the 
court continued the rule set out in Marcera:  district courts may certify 
defendant class actions under Rule 23(b)(2).246  However, it listed two 
limitations.247  The first is that the class must be bilateral, which requires 
that there are both plaintiff and defendant classes.248  The second is that the 
defendant class must consist of public officials and not private actors.249  
Ultimately, this approach assists plaintiffs in largescale civil rights class 
actions in their ability to sue state officials for unconstitutional policies.250 
2.  The Literal Approach:  
No Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2) 
In Tilley v. TJX Cos.,251 the First Circuit outlined the literal approach.252  
Here, a graphic designer sued the Dennis East Company and TJX for 
copying her design and selling it to more than 550 retailers across the 
country.253  The plaintiff moved to certify a defendant class consisting of all 
retailers who used her copyrighted design, alleging equitable and injunctive 
relief under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).254  The district court certified the 
defendant class with TJX as the class representative, prompting an 
interlocutory appeal from the defendants.255 
The First Circuit ruled that Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply to defendant 
classes, reasoning that the drafters of the Rule did not contemplate such 
circumstances.256  The court relied heavily on the text of the Rule, which 
provides that class certification is possible when “the party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
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class.”257  The court emphasized that the Rule only applies to the “party 
opposing the class,” not members of the class itself.258 
The court added that the drafters made no references to defendant classes 
and only used plaintiff classes as examples to illustrate the application of 
the Rule.259  Additionally, this case was distinguishable from Marcera 
because the class opposing injunctive relief in that case was a group of local 
public officials, not actors in the private sector.260  Thus, the court held that 
a defendant class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).261 
The dichotomy with defendant class actions is important because the 
Second Circuit provides a mechanism for plaintiffs that is not readily 
apparent in the text of Rule 23(b)(2).262  While the Second Circuit’s 
approach is limited to litigation against public officials, it allows plaintiffs 
to use aggregate litigation as a device to hold the state accountable for civil 
rights violations.263  Allowing such suits against defendant classes in 
injunctive relief cases promotes enforcement of legislative and 
constitutional norms by “get[ting] to the heart” of institutional reforms.264 
After detailing how the Second Circuit has crafted its standards of 
appellate review, predominance, and certification of defendant classes, it is 
critical to show how the Second Circuit’s standards are amenable to class 
certification.  The comparative analysis from this section is dissected in the 
next section to determine how favorable the Second Circuit’s standards are 
and whether they incentivize forum shopping. 
III.  DOES THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
INCENTIVIZE FORUM SHOPPING? 
This part uses the analysis from the previous section and evaluates the 
notion that the Second Circuit’s standards are favorable to class 
certification, thereby incentivizing filing class actions in district courts 
within the Second Circuit.  Part III.A explains the favorability toward class 
certification of the Second Circuit’s standards of appellate review, 
predominance requirements in 23(c)(4) class actions, and approach to 
23(b)(2) defendant class actions.  Part III.B then answers the fundamental 
question of whether these standards might motivate attorneys seeking class 
certification to file in the Second Circuit. 
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A.  Are the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards 
Favorable to Class Certification? 
This section is divided into three subsections, each addressing whether 
the Second Circuit’s standards are favorable toward class certification.  Part 
III.A.1 concludes that the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review is 
favorable to class certification.  Part III.A.2 surmises that the Second 
Circuit’s approach toward Rule 23(b)(3) predominance in Rule 23(c)(4) 
class actions is partial toward certification.  Finally, Part III.A.3 determines 
that the Second Circuit approval of Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class actions is 
preferential toward class certification. 
1.  Standard of Appellate Review 
The cases applying the modern Second Circuit standard discussed in Part 
II.A.1 indicate that the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review favors 
class certification.  The standard articulated explicitly states that appellate 
courts should be more deferential toward grants of class certification than 
denials.265  While there arguably is a debate as to why and how the Second 
Circuit arrived at this standard of appellate review,266 its language and 
application are unequivocally advantageous toward certification of class 
actions and skeptical of denials.267 
In fact, the Second Circuit reversed district court denials of class 
certification in a broad spectrum of cases.268  There is no common pattern 
in these cases other than the Second Circuit finding that the trial court’s 
decision to deny certification was erroneous.269  In contrast, the ordinary 
abuse of discretion standard shows no favoritism toward certification or 
denial.270  It demonstrates a commitment toward affirming the trial court 
ruling, regardless of whether it granted or denied certification.271  The 
abuse of discretion standard is decidedly neutral on the issue of certification 
and is not heavily biased in favor of certification like the Second Circuit’s 
standard.272  The evidence of this assertion is that the abuse of discretion 
standard provides significant deference toward the trial court, as each case 
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analyzed in this Note shows.273  Considering that this is the view followed 
by eight of the eleven circuits, the Second Circuit’s approach toward the 
standard of appellate review of class certification is more favorable toward 
class certification than the majority of circuits.274 
The Seventh Circuit view appears to be even less favorable toward class 
certification than the courts applying the abuse of discretion standard.275  If 
the Second Circuit is on the opposite end of the spectrum as a “certification 
friendly” forum, and the majority of the circuits are “certification neutral,” 
the Seventh Circuit is “certification hostile.”276  While the Seventh Circuit’s 
“not abject” language was not as explicit as the Second Circuit’s language 
in indicating its view on certification, the case where the standard was 
articulated sheds light on how it may apply in practice.277  In CE Design, 
the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision to grant certification 
and remanded the case back to the district court.278  This is a result that 
would be highly unlikely under both the Second Circuit’s and majority’s 
approaches because each of those standards of appellate review provide 
significant deference to the trial court’s decision on class certification.279  
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, at least in the way it was applied in the 
first instance in CE Design, does not give the same amount of deference on 
grants of class certification as the Second Circuit’s or majority’s 
standards.280 
The Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review of decisions to grant or 
deny class certification is an obvious example of the court adopting an 
approach favorable to class certification.  However, in contrast to the 
Seventh Circuit’s “deferential but not abject” standard and the majority’s 
abuse of discretion standard, the Second Circuit’s candid preference for 
certification becomes even clearer.  Considering the Second Circuit (along 
with the Ninth Circuit) adopted a position that is more supportive of class 
certification than the rest of the federal appellate courts, the Second 
Circuit’s law on this issue clearly favors class certification.281 
2.  Satisfying Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance 
in a Rule 23(c)(4) Class Action 
The difference in jurisprudence between the Second and Fifth Circuits on 
this particular issue presents a fairly clear dividing line.282  The Second 
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Circuit requires predominance only on the individual question, whereas the 
Fifth Circuit requires predominance on the cause of action generally.283  
According to a prominent treatise on class actions, this narrow issue does 
not appear to have a minority and majority view because most circuits have 
not adopted a concrete position.284  Therefore, in determining whether the 
Second Circuit’s approach favors class certification, the only point of 
comparison (other than the Ninth Circuit) is the Fifth Circuit’s view.285 
The Second Circuit’s approach gives significant leeway in meeting the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), and plaintiffs’ attorneys should 
be able to move past class certification if they can show predominance on 
individual questions.286  In Nassau County, there were still individual 
questions regarding reasonable suspicion, damages calculations, and 
proximate causation.287  However, the common question regarding 
unconstitutional blanket policy predominated over these individual 
questions.288  Therefore, for an attorney filing in this forum, satisfaction of 
predominance in a Rule 23(c)(4) class action is relatively simple.  If there is 
a single, overarching question that connects the individual ones, like the 
question of the strip search policy in Nassau County, predominance should 
be met, and the action will move past the certification stage.289 
The Fifth Circuit effectively requires plaintiffs to specify the mechanisms 
of class treatment on each particular issue.290  This is a heavier burden for 
attorneys because it requires them to show predominance on each question 
that is presented.291  Essentially, the Fifth Circuit will decline to certify a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class if there is an important issue in the trial that will 
ultimately require individual determinations.292  For example, in the 
Castano case, there were overarching questions of whether cigarettes 
caused various illnesses and whether the tobacco industry failed to warn 
consumers of the danger of cigarette smoking.293  Under the Second Circuit 
rule, this likely would be enough to satisfy predominance.294  Instead, the 
Fifth Circuit found that the variances in law, exposure, and causation 
predominated over these larger issues enough to not satisfy the 
predominance requirement in a 23(c)(4) class.295 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these two cases is that the Second 
Circuit’s approach makes class certification substantially easier, while the 
Fifth Circuit’s stricter position makes it difficult to satisfy in complex class 
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actions.296  In fact, when considering which rule to adopt, the Second 
Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s view in favor of the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard.297  The Second Circuit chose a view that is more lenient 
in granting class certification when compared to the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach.298  Therefore, when contrasted with the Fifth Circuit’s rule, the 
Second Circuit’s approach favors class certification on this issue. 
3.  Certifying Rule 23(b)(2) Defendant Class Actions 
The Second Circuit is unique in permitting plaintiffs to sue a class of 
defendants under Rule 23(b)(2).299  The other circuits strictly prohibit this 
particular type of class action.300  The Second Circuit actually allows 
certification on this issue, whereas other circuits deny the existence of the 
Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class action altogether.301  While the Second 
Circuit does have limitations to this type of class action, it is abundantly 
clear that permitting the certification of a particular type of class action, as 
opposed to prohibiting it, is advantageous toward class certification.  
Therefore, the Second Circuit approach on Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class 
actions favors class certification. 
B.  The Second Circuit 
Encourages Class Action Forum Shopping 
Although it is clear that the Second Circuit is more favorable toward 
class certification than other circuits, the question remains as to whether 
this incentivizes attorneys to file in the Second Circuit as opposed to other 
circuits.302 
The illustration provided in the introduction of this Note provides an 
example of why favorable certification standards similar to the ones 
adopted by the Second Circuit would encourage forum shopping.303  As 
previously discussed, CAFA has changed the landscape by expanding 
federal jurisdiction over class actions.304  Many nationwide class actions 
will be unable to satisfy any of the jurisdictional exceptions to diversity 
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unless the parties and the events are deeply rooted in the forum state.305  
The plaintiffs’ attorney may decide to file in state court anyway, in hope of 
the (unlikely) event that the case is remanded to state court after being 
removed to federal court, because the state law is more favorable to 
certification than federal law.306  However, other attorneys might decide to 
expedite the process, and avoid the delay of two months or more, by filing 
their class action in federal court.307  Moreover, they would prefer this 
option if they wish to exercise some discretion over the choice of forum, 
which they lose if the defendants remove the case.308 
The attorneys who choose this option must prioritize the considerations 
that matter when choosing which federal forum best suits their class 
action.309  Class certification is not the only consideration or even the 
primary consideration for all attorneys.310  Some may consider the 
proximity of the forum to their class or the favorability of the discovery 
rules.311  However, for an attorney filing a Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class 
action under Rule 23(c)(4), or a Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class action, 
differences in class certification standards between the circuits will animate 
their decision because these class actions are unique and relatively 
uncommon.312  The procedural standards are less developed on these issues, 
and there are few forums that have lenient standards for these types of 
classes.313  Indeed, the choice might be between one forum that allows 
certification and one that does not.314  The choice of forum, in these cases, 
is quite predictable.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking certification of these 
classes have little choice but to file the lawsuit in the Second Circuit. 
In fact, some plaintiffs’ attorneys prioritize the applicable class 
certification law in filing decisions.315  Generally, it appears that state law 
on certification is more lenient than federal law.316  However, state court is 
not an option in many class actions post-CAFA due to the difficulties in 
satisfying one of the jurisdictional exceptions.317  If these attorneys place 
high value on lenient certification standards, they will choose the forum that 
has procedural requirements meeting this criterion, all other things being 
equal.318 
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 318. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  The favorability of the Second Circuit’s 
class certification procedures does not only incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to file in this 
forum, but can likewise incentivize defendants in limited circumstances as well. See supra 
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The Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review would be a 
consideration for plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking class certification as well, 
even if they were filing ordinary Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions.319  The Second Circuit, when compared to every jurisdiction other 
than the Ninth Circuit seems like a safe option if the district court denies 
class certification.320  A plaintiffs’ attorney that is unsure whether the class 
will be certified could reasonably conclude that he has a better chance of 
certification on appeal in the Second Circuit due to the relatively minimal 
deference given to denials of class certification.321  Therefore, it is logical, 
if all other considerations in the case are equal, that the plaintiffs’ attorney 
will file the class action in the Second Circuit.322 
The purpose of this Note is not to take aim at CAFA for creating 
horizontal forum shopping in the federal system nor to criticize the Second 
Circuit for adopting positions that encourage a type of forum shopping.  
Instead, this Note highlights that attorneys can utilize the Second Circuit’s 
standards when seeking class certification in pivotal class action 
lawsuits.323  The case law surveyed in this Note illuminates the kinds of 
cases that are impacted by these standards.324 
The importance of these outcomes cannot be minimized.  The Second 
Circuit positions on class certification have allowed the prosecution of 
substantive legal rights in major class actions, ranging from 
unconstitutional infringement of civil liberties to harms caused by labor 
violations.325  Imagine if Castano was decided in the Second Circuit.  That 
case was one of the largest class action lawsuits in American history.326  
Millions of consumers had allegedly suffered injuries from cigarette use.327  
At the same time, an entire industry faced significant liability.328  Affirming 
the decision to grant class certification by the trial court would have 
drastically changed the outcome of that case, potentially striking a stunning 
victory for consumers rather than the tobacco industry.329  Viewed in a 
vacuum, Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class actions and Rule 23(b)(2) 
defendant class actions seem like technical, insignificant rules in the 
 
certification requirements. See supra Part I.B.  But this study did not appear to calculate the 
number of defendants seeking certification of a settlement in order to reduce the costs of 
litigation and the amount owed to the plaintiffs. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
In such a settlement class action, especially if it were a Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class, 
defense attorneys would prefer the Second Circuit’s lenient standards on certification. See 
supra note 49 and accompanying text.  Though this Note is largely geared toward addressing 
the forum selection considerations a plaintiff might have, it is important to note that 
sometimes defendants are also seeking certification for a settlement. 
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 321. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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 323. See supra Part II. 
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 326. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 327. See id. at 737. 
 328. See id. at 752. 
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broader class action context.  Yet the way different forums construct these 
“technical rules” has a profound impact on the substantive rights of 
Americans in class actions.330 
The Second Circuit’s approach toward class certification merits 
observation in the coming years.  The potential forum shopping described 
in this Note is limited to any areas where the Second Circuit currently has 
favorable class certification standards.  If the Second Circuit continues to 
craft additional procedures favorable to class certification, perhaps it might 
be time to revisit those standards and consider whether this is a sensible 
approach.  In the interim, however, the Second Circuit should be noted 
among lawyers as a forum that has adopted certification-friendly procedures 
on narrow issues that have a substantial influence on the outcome of critical 
class action lawsuits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence, when compared to 
that of the other circuits, is distinctly favorable toward certification.  The 
consequence is that attorneys seeking certification in a federal forum are 
incentivized to file their class actions in the Second Circuit due to its 
certification-friendly measures.  It is unclear whether the Second Circuit 
will construct additional procedures amenable to class certification.  
However, it is clear that the Second Circuit’s current approach has enabled 
plaintiffs to pursue their substantive legal rights in large-scale class action 
litigation by allowing their cases to proceed past the certification stage. 
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